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NOTES.
LAW GOVERNING THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR BREAcH OF
CONTRAcT-In the recent case of Walton School of Commerce v.
Stroud 1 the defendant had subscribed for courses of instruction from
the plaintiff. The contract was made in Illinois and the defendant
agreed to pay in the same state, whereas the plaintiff undertook to
send the instructions to the defendant in Michigan. The defendant
refused to accept the instructions, whereupon the plaintiff sued in a
Michigan court in assumpsit. The Supreme Court of Michigan held
that the plaintiff was entitled only to such damages as were recover-
able under the laws of Michigan.
This problem of the law governing the measure of damages for
breach of contract, presents in its broader aspects a trio of possi-
bilities: (I) lex loci contractus or the law of the place where the
contract was executed (2) lex loci solutionis or the law of the place
where the contract was to be performed (3) lex fori or the law of
the place where suit was brought. Before formulating any general
principle or considering the propriety of applying the law of any
one of the above-mentioned jurisdictions, it is advisable to examine
the nature and basis of the theory of damages in contract actions.
Technically, the right to recover damages for breach of contract
arises only at the moment the contract is breached.' The right of
action thereby created is to be distinguished from the original con-
tract right which was embodied in its terms and which was merely
the right to the performance of the other party.8 For this reason the
right to recover damages for the promisor's failure to perform, has
been described as a substitute furnished by the law, being equivalent to
and taking the place of the promisee's contract right to performance.
4
When we attempt to apply this theoretical rule of damages to a
situation in which a contract has been executed in one place, to be
performed in another, and is sued upon in still a third, we are con-
fronted with a problem in conflict of laws. Conceding that the plain-
tiff's cause of action is essentially a substituted right, under what
law has that right been created? In answering this question, let us
assume for the moment that the measure of damages grows out of
the substance of the substituted right rather than the remedy, so that
the law creating this right may be said to establish the proper measure
1226 N. W. 883 (Mich. 1929).
I SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES (4th ed. 1916) § 7.
'See Atwood v. Walker 179 Mass. 514, 529, 61 N. E. 58, 6o (igoi). Sub-
stantially the same reasoning, applied to torts, is found in Goodrich, Damages for
a Foreign Wrong (1917) 3 IOWA L. Bum. i.
'GoODRICH, CONFLICT oF LAWS (1927) 183; 4 SEDGwlcK, DAMAGES (9th
ed. 1912) § 1373.
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of damages. On principle and on grounds of convenience it would
appear that such law should be the law of the place where perform-
ance was to have been made. The right to damages arises from the
breach, and the breach occurred at the place of promised performance.
True, there can be no particular magic attached to the fact that the
breach occurred within the physical boundaries of a certain state; 5
yet, as a matter of policy, there would seem to be more reason for
holding the law of such place to govern, than the lx loci con-
fractus or the lex for. The contracting parties can reasonably be
supposed to have contemplated such breach as drawing with it the
application of the law of the place where the breach occurred.6
If an analogy be made to the tort situation, the argument seems
even dearer. There, it is usually held that the law of the place where
the injury was suffered, viz., where the tort duty was violated,
should measure the damages whether the duty be statutory or not.7
Similarly in breach of contract the academic conclusions reached by
the process of reasoning outlined above have been sustained by the
weight of adjudicated cases." In general, then, it may be stated that
both legal principle and decided precedents establish the rule that the
leax loci solutionis determines the measure of damages for breach of
simple contract.
In Walton School of Commerce v. Stroud the majority of the
court reasoned from the premise that the measure of damages was
*It may be argued that such breach is really a negative act, and that an
absence of performance can hardly be considered an act-taking place within the
confines of any one state. Lorenzen, Validity and Effects of Contracts (1921)
3 YALE L. J. 53.
6 1 SUTHERLAND, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1146. This reasoning has been crit-
icised on the ground that the contracting parties seldom, consider the legal conse-
quences of their acts. Lorenzen, op cit. supra note 5, at 71.
7 Northern Pacific R. R. v. Babcock, 154 U. S. 190, 14 Sup. Ct. 978 (893);
Lauria v. Dupont de Nemours, z4 Fed. 687 (E. D. N. Y. 19,7) ; American Ry.
Express Co. v. Davis, I52 Ark. 258, 238 S. W. 50 (1922). The principle extends
to causes of action arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Chesa-
peake & Ohio Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U. S. 485, 36 Sup. Ct. 630 (1I16); Cincinnati,
N. 0. & T. P. Ry. v. McWhorter, 21o Ky. IoS, 275 S. W. 363 (1925). Other'
courts apply the lex fori on the ground that the question is one of remedy rather
than one of substantive right. Dorr Cattle Co. v. National Bank, 127 Iowa 53,
ioz N. W. 836 (905) ; Higgins v. Central New Eng. R. R. 55 Mass. 7T6, 2
N. E. 534 (1892). See Wooden v. Western New York R. R., 126 N. Y. IO, 26
N. E. 1050 (I89). Some authorities differentiate common law and statutory
rights of action in tort. MrNoP, CONFLICT OF LAWS (IOI) 488. However,
there would seem to be no fundamental basis for this distinction. 2 WHARTON,
CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed. i9O5) iioS.
8Randolph Grocery Co. v. Lamborn, 3 F. (2d) 139 (C. C. A. 4th, 1924);
Home Land & Title Co. v. McNamara, 145 F. 17 (C. C. A. 7th, i9o6); Sand-
ham v. Grounds, 94 Fed. 83 (C. C. A., 3d, 1899); Meyer v. Estes, 164 Mass. 457,
41 N. E. 683 (1895); Brown v. Camden Ry., 83 Pa. 3X6 (1877). Most text
writers are in accord. I SUTHERLAND, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1144; 4 SEFG-
wicK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 2758; COmmENTARI S ON CONFLICr OF LAWS
RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1928) § 451. In principle the rule should apply to
anticipatory breach, and to damages in equity in lieu of specific performance.
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a matter of remedy to be governed by the lex forif On this point
the court was not without authority.10 Most courts, however, con-
sider the problem one of right rather than of remedy, 1' insisting
that remedy concerns only- the procedure utilized to enforce the right.
While the court of the forum performs the actual function of enter-
ing judgment in terms of damages, it would seem logical that what-
ever law determines the existence of a substituted right to damages,
should at the same time govern its nature and extent.'2 In this sense
the measure of damages for breach of contract is essentially a matter
going to the substance of the substituted right, rather than to the
procedural remedy supplied by the forum.'3s
The dissenting opinion in the principal case, while properly con-
sidering the question as one of substantive right rather than of
remedy, failed to ascertain the precise right which was being en-
forced. In deciding that the lex loci contractus. should apply,14 the
dissent ignored the fundamental concept that damages arise not di-
rectly from the terms of the contract, but because the contract has
been breached. The validity of the contract is not squarely in issue.
While cases are frequently cited for the proposition advanced by
the dissent,' 5 an analysis of the facts in many of them reveals that
'While the majority of the court expressly bases its holding upon the
premise that the question is solely a matter of remedy, its decision is somewhat
weakened by. the fact, that in its opinion, Michigan and Illinois apply the
same measure of damages for breach of executory contract.
" Dorr Cattle Co. v. National Bank; Higgins v. Central New Eng. R. R.;
Wooden v. Western New York R. R., all supra note 7. MINOR, op. cit. supra2
note 7, at 488, 515.
' Such is the theory in tort cases. See Northern Pacific R. R. v. Babcock;
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kelly; Lauria v. DuPont de Nemours, all supra note
7. That it is equally applicable to the contract situation, has been recognized by
the decided cases and most text authorities. 4 SEDGWICK, op. cit. supra note 4, at
2758; 2 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 7, at 928. Another view suggests that
the real question is whether the law of the forum on grounds of policy should
incorporate the lex loci solutionis or the lex loci contractus. Lorenzen, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 71.
2 4 $EDGWiCK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 2758; Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 17. Since the purpose of the substituted right is to fully compensate the
promisee for the loss of the promisor's performance, the elements to be consid-
ered in so compensating should be determined by the law creating that right.
"A distinction must be drawn between this proposition and a situation in
which the local judicial machinery of the forum is inadequate to enforce a right
created by foreign law. Slater v. Mexican Cent. R. Co., 194 U. S. 120, 24 Sup.
Ct 581 (19o4). Likewise, the public policy of the forum may forbid enforce-
ment of such foreign right See Atwood v. Walker, supra note 4, at 518, 61
N. E. at 6o; Northern Pacific R. R. v. Babcock, spra note 8, at 198, 14 Sup. Ct.
at 981. This does not necessarily mean that the lex fori will be applied in every
detail. See 2 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 8, at 1112.
. " The dissent found some difficulty in determining the place of performance,
observing that inasmuch as the.plaintiff and defendant were to perform in dif-
ferent places, there was no definite place of performance, and that the lex loci
contractus was presumably the place of performance.
"Atwood v. Walker, supra note 3; Looney v. Reeves, 5 Kans. App. 279, 48
Pac. 6o6 (1897).
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the locus contractus and the locus solutionis happened to be the
same.'8
An examination of other types of obligations in the broad field
of contract, discloses ample authority to support the more logical
view that the measure of damages is determined by the lex loci
solutionis. Thus, it applies to promissory notes whether the maker
or the'indorser be sued.'- If the action be brought upon a bill, the
law of the place of payment applies if the acceptor be sued. How-
ever, when the drawer is the defendant, damages are measured by
the law of the place where the bill was drawn 1 8 because'such is the
place of the drawer's performance. Some difficulty has arisen in the
case of contracts to' convey land. Where a covenant in a warranty
deed conveying land has been breached, the courts reach varying
results, 19 but where a simple contract to convey has been breached,
the better rule invokes the lex loci solutionis. °
Where no definite place of performance is mentioned in the con-
tract, the place where the contract was made is presumably the place
of performance. 21 Further complications arise in the converse situa-
tion where performance is expressly to be made continuously in sev-
eral successive places. Some courts solve the problem by viewing
the entire performance as taking place at the final step or with the
final act of the promisor, so that the locus solutionis becomes the place
of the completing act of performance. 22 The more logical, if some-
what more impractical courts refuse to adopt such fictions, and recog-
nize the fact that the place of performance shifts from place to place
as each stage of the contract is fulfilled.23 Another variation appears
'Atwood v. Walker, supra note 3.
Slacum v. Pomery, 6 Cranch 2i (U. S. I8IO). The indorsement is a
separate contract to be performed, in the absence of contrary intent, at the place
of indorsement
"Bank of U. S. v. U. S., 2 How. 7x (U. S. 18 44); Kuenzi v. Elvers, 14
La. Ann. 391 (859).
" Some courts apply the lex fori. Hazelett v. Woodruff, 150 Mo. 534, 51
S. W. io48 (i899); Platner v. Vincent, I94 Cal. 436, 229 Pac. 24 (I924).
Others apply the lex rei sitw. Tillotson v. Prichard, 6o Vt 94, 14 AtI. 302-
(1887). Still others adopt the lex loci confractus. Looney v. Reeves, supra
note 15.
= i WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 7, at 627; cf. Atwood v. Walker, -upra
note 3. The lex rei .itar does not govern because title and seisin are not imme-
diately involved.
'Kavanaugh v. Day, io R. I. 393 (1873) ; Shipman v. Bailey, 20W . Va.
I4O (i842). In the case of a note, delivery as well as execution is significant.
Gage v. McSweeney, 74 Vt. 370, 52 Atl. 969 (902).
2Dike v. Erie Ry Co., 45 N. Y. 113 (8871) ; Curtis v. D. L. & W. R R., 74
N. Y. ii6 (1878); see Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397,
459 (i888). This explanation seems plausible in telegraph cases when the actual
injury is suffered at the place of ultimate delivery to the sendee of the message.
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lacer, 822 Ky. 839, 93 S. W. 34 (i9o6).
I Burnett v. Pa. R. R. Co., 176 Pa. 45, 34 AUt. 972 (i896). If the breach
occurs at any intermediate place, the law of that place governs the measure of
damages.
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in the shape of alternative performance, where the promisor has the
option to perform in either of several places. If he elects one of the
alternatives, that place becomes the locus solutionis.24  Should he
fail to elect or to perform in any place, a logical difficulty arises. In
the light of the presumption invoked in the situation where no place
of performance had been specified, it seems reasonable to resort to
the same solution when the promisor has failed to exercise his elec-
tion. Hence, the place of making may be considered the place of
performance and breach for the purpose of measuring damages.
The same basic problem arises with reference to interest in the
case of promises to pay money. It is clear that when the payment
of interest is an express provision of the contract, the question is not
one of damages but rather of interpreting the contract. Hence, the
law determining the validity of the contract should decide the validity
of the interest rate,25 being mindful of the public policy of the forum.
Where there is no specific stipulation for interest and the contract
has been breached, interest is allowed as part of the damages for the
breach,2 and not as a term of the contract. Here again the question
of what law is to be applied in awarding such interest leads to varying
results. Treating the problem as one of remedy, some courts apply
the lex foriy7 especially where the contract mentions no definite place
of performance.2 8  Most courts, however, follow the fundamental rule
governing breach of contract in general and apply the lex loci solu-
tionds.29 As has been pointed out, this is the more logical view, and it
' MINOR, op. cit. suprca note 7, at 382; cf. Porter v. Price, 80 Fed. 655 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1897).
Generally the Tex loci contractus governs. Thornton v. Dean, 19 S. C.
583 (1883) ; Shipman v. Bailey, 20 W. Va. 40 (1882) ; cf. Baxter v. Beckwith,
25 Colo. App. 322, 137 Pac. 9O1 (914) where the lex loci sofutionis was applied.
The same rule applies to an express contract provision for liquidated damages.
'Lake Drainage District v. Crane, 112 Neb. 323, 199 N. W. 526 (1924).
'Hays v. Arbucde, 72 Colo. 328, 211 Pac. io (1922) ; Johnson v. Jones, 62
Ind. App. 4, 112 N. E. 83o (1916); Ives v. Farmers' Bank, 2 Allenr 236 (Mass.
1861). Critics of this view argue that it fails to give full faith and credit to
judgments of other states. Whitman v. Citizens' Bank, iio Fed. 503 (C. C. A.
2d, 19Ol). Adherents of the lex fori view contend that interest, whether ex-
pressly payable or not, is not an integral part of such foreign judgment, and as
such need not be recognized by the forum. Clark v. Child, 136 Mass. 344
(1884). Many authorities treat the interest as an essential element of the judg-
ment. Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 3, at 22.
Goddard v. Foster, 17 Wall. 123 (U. S. 1872) ; Kopelke v. Kopelke, 112
Ind. 435, 13 N. E. 695 (1887); ef. Wittkowski v. Harris, 64 Fed. 712 (W. D.
N. C. 1894) ; Clark v. Searight, 135 Pa. 173, 19 Aft. 941 (189o).
Pana v. Bowler, 107 U. S. 529, 2 Sup. Ct. 704 (1882) ; Scotland County v.
Hill, 132 U. S. 1O7, IO Sup. Ct. 26 (1889); Eastfield v. McKeon, 208 Fed. 58o
(S. D. Ala. 1913) ; Peck v. Mayo, 14 Vt. 33 (1842). An obvious exception exists
where state bonds bear interest only with the consent of the state. In such case,
no interest is allowed unless given by the laws of that state, regardless of the
place where the bonds are payable. U. S. v. North Carolina, 136 U. S. 211, io
Sup. Ct 920 (i89o). Where the law of the place of performance is not proved,
it is usually presumed to be the same as the lez fori. Reynolds v. Powers, 96
Ky. 481, 29 S. W. 299 (1895); Hall v. Kimball, 58 Ill. 58 (1871). Cmttra:
Kermott v. Ayer, ii Mich. 181 (1863).
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has been extended to actions brought upon a foreign judgment. The
plaintiff's cause of action or right to recover damages was created at
the moment the foreign judgment was entered. Therefore, the
amount of such judgment has been held to bear interest according to
the law of the place where judgment was rendered.30
Recapitulation of the foregoing authorities touching upon numer-
ous examples of contract action, reveals a consistent tendency to
adhere to the underlying principle that damages are measured by the
law of the place where the contract right was breached. In depart-
ing from this cardinal precept, and treating the matter as one of
remedy, the court in Walton School of Commerce v. Stroud, while
not alone in its conception of the problem, has not followed the well-
defined current of authority.
J. A. S., Jr.
USE OF INJUNCTION IN ELECTION DISPUTES-EQUITABLE JURIS-
DICTION OVER NoN-PROPERTY RIGHTs-The modem development
and increasing legal importance of personal rights has not only accen-
tuated the attempts of courts of equity to evade the jurisdictional doc-
trine that denies equitable protection to non-property rights,' but has
also increased, both in vehemence and volume, the journalistic attacks
upon this doctrinaire limitation.2  Notwithstanding this widespread
disapproval, the doctrine remains, giving rise to decisions that are in
sharp contrast with the high spirit of morality theoretically motivating
equity.The recent Indiana case of Green v. Holmes 3 affords an illustra-
tion. City Council of New Albany, on petition of voters, ordered an
election to determine whether the city manager plan of government
should be adopted. Plaintiff, a petitioner for the election, after the
mayor had refused to act, filed this bill in equity against him to compel
the appointment of two election commissioners, as required by law.
Stewart v. Spalding, 72 Cal. 264, 13 Pac. 66i (887) ; Schroeder v. Boyce,
i27 Mich. 33, 86 N. W. 387 (i9oi). A contrary view seems to apply the interest
rate of the forum. Hopkins v. Shepard, 129 Mass. 6oo (i88o) ; Wells Fargo &
Co. v. Davis, 105 N. Y. 67o, 2 N. E. 42 (1887). In such cases, however, the
law of the place where judgment was rendered either allowed no interest or was
not proved in the court of the forum.
'See infra notes 19, 20, 22-27, 34.
-Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Privacy (i89o) 4 HARv. L. RaV.
193; Can a Court of Equity Protect Personal Rights? (1898) 37 L. R. A;
738; Equitable Protection of Political Rights (914) i4 COL. L. REV. 243;
Pound, Equitable Relief against Defamation and Injuries to Personality (1g16)
29 HARv. L. REv. 640; Jurisdiction of Equity to Protect Personal Rights (192i)
14 A. L. R. 295; Chafee, Equitable Relief Against Torts (1921) 34 HARv. L.
REv. 388; Long, Equitable Jurisdiction to Protect Personal Rights (1923) 33
YALE L. J. n; Chafee, Does Equity Follow the Law of Torts? (1926) 75
U. OF PA. L. REV. i; Tretter, Equity; Jurisdiction over Political Rights (1927)
13 CORN. L. Q. 287; (1929) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 114.
3I66 N. E. 281 (Ind. I929), noted in (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 1015.
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Defendant mayor appealed the order granting the injunction, and the
Supreme Court of Indiana, by a divided court, reversed the decree on
three grounds: first, that an adequate remedy at law, mandamus,
existed; second, that the injury, if any, was to the general public, and
the petitioner, having suffered no "special" damage, could not bring
an action in his own name; and third, that equity will not protect polit-
ical rights. The answer to the first, as pointed out in the dissenting
opinion, was that mandamus was inadequate since it could not have
issued until after the date set for the election.4 As to the second, it
may be said, as many cases have held,5 that the interest, financial or
otherwise, of a voter or taxpayer in his government is sufficient to
enable him to prevent, in his own name, and for his own benefit, any
illegal or unconstitutional act relating thereto. The adjudication of
the issue is therefore reduced to, and solely dependent on, the existence
of equitable jurisdiction over political rights.
Equity originated, in both England and Rome, to do justice where
the available legal remedy was inadequate.6 But this simple vera
causa, inadequacy of remedy at law, according to the weight of author-
ity,7 is not of itself sufficient to justify the intervention of equity; the
subject matter of the cause, it is said, must involve rights of property
to invoke equitable protection, and such protection will be denied to
'Green v. Holmes, supra note 3, at 284. The following cases have
allowed an injunction where the usual remedy, mandamus, was, for some special
reason appearing in the case, insufficient: Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210 (U. S.
1830) ; Potter v. Campbell, 155 Ky. 784, i6o S. W. 763 (913); Bourke v.
Alcott Water Co., 84 Vt. 121, 78 At. 715 (1911).
' In the following cases, all involving political matters, injunctions were
issued at the instance of a voter or taxpayer. While in every case, some
political right is protected, the bases for assuming jurisdiction are alleged
to be either the property interest of a taxpayer in the government, or the
fraudulent, illegal, or ultra vires acts of a public officer. It should also be
noticed that in no instance was the damage of the petitioner different .from,
or greater than, the corresponding damage to other taxpayers or citizens, yet
relief was not withheld on this ground. Semones v. Needles, 137 Ia. 177,
114 N. W. 904 (i9o8) (suit to prevent use of "padded" census list) ; Staples
v. State, 244 S. W. io68 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) (suit to prevent certification
on ballots of candidates not so entitled) ; Gibson v. Trinity County, 8o Cal.
359, 22 Pac. 225 (1889) (suit contesting election providing for bond issue);
Maysville v. Smith, 132 Ga. 316, 64 S. E. 131 (1909) (suit to restrain attempt
by officials to relocate county lines) ; Tolbert v. Long, 134 Ga. 292, 67 S. E.
826 (i9IO) (suit contesting election of commissioners) ; Boren v. Smith, 47
Ill. 482 (1868) (suit to determine county-seat); Marsden v. Harlocker, 48
Ore. go, 85 Pac. 328 (r9o6) (suit to determine legality of election) ; Cascaden
v. City of Waterloo, io6 Ia. 673, 77 N. W. 33 (i8g8) (suit to restrain elec-
tion in new ward, claimed to have been illegally created) ; Ellinghamn v. Dye,
178 Ind. 336, 99 N. E. I (1912) (suit to enjoin election to adopt new con-
stitution). See LEWIS & PUTNEY, ELCIrON LAws (i912) §49. As to "spe-
cial" damage, see Jeremiah Smith in (1915) 15 CoL- L. REv. I, where he
reaches the conclusion that "special" damage is merely "actual" as opposed to
"theoretical" damage.
'CLARK, EQUITY (1912) § I.
SCLARK, op. cit. supra note 6, c. 3, § L and cases cited; POMEROY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE (2d ed. 1919) §§ 1753-1755.
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personal or political rights. An examination of this rule discloses
that the sole justification for its present-day retention is the doctrine
of stare decisis.
Early chancery granted injunctions to protect all recognized
rights, property or otherwise. For example in Hoigges v. Harry.'
decided in the fifteenth century, a decree enjoined the practice of
witchcraft. The first important enunciation of the rule restricting the
powers of equity to rights of property is found in an early nineteenth
century dictum of Lord Eldon in Gee v. PritchardY The rule seems
to have resulted from the fact that at that early date, most recognized
rights were property rights, and the few personal rights then existing,
such as the interests in freedom from assault, battery and false impris-
onment, were thoroughly protected by the law courts. 10 Hence chan-
cery adjudicated but few cases involving non-property rights,1' and
when, in its crystallizing process, equity formed definite rules of juris-
diction, -12 it laid down the principle that injunctions will issue only to
protect legal rights, and limited these protected legal interests to the
only rights for which protection was usually sought of equity, namely,
property rights. 13 As a criterion for ddtermining whether equity shall
assume jurisdiction, the property rule, based as it was on inadequacy
of remedy at law, served as a reasonable test for many years; but the
modem development of rights other than those of property,' 4 espe-
cially in view of the strained judicial interpretations lately placed upon
the rule, has destroyed the adequacy of this jurisdictional formula.
There seems to be, moreover, an additional historical reason for
the denial of protection to political rights. At common law, the politi-
cal rights of citizens were disregarded. A political wrong was an
injury, not against the individual, but against the king, and only the
'i Cal. Ch. xxiv. See Barbour, Fifteenth-Century Chancery (1918) 31
H~Av. L. Rav. 834.
92 Swans. 403 (1818).
"In addition to the criminal and civil remedies, the defendant could
always be bound to keep the peace. See Long, supra note 2, at 115-116.
"An additional reason may be that ". . . at that time courts of equity
were hesitant in dealing with torts, feeling a natural reluctance to try ques-
tions which were adapted peculiarly to trial by jury." Pound, supra note 2,
at 644.
CLAR, op. cit. supra note 6, § 15. Pound, The Decadence of Equity
(905) 5 COL. L. REv. 20.
"It is contended by Long, supra note 2, at 116, that "from this fact
[adequate protection of early personal rights by law courts], and also from
the fact that a courb of equity will take cognizance of cases not ordinarily
falling within its jurisdiction, for example, criminal cases, when necessary
to protect rights of property, the conclusion has naturally been reached that
the existence of a property right needing protection is the test of equity juris-
diction."
" "Civil rights statutes, rights of privacy, the larger recognition of a right
to damages for injuries to the feelings or mental suffering, all these indicate
the growth of personal as distinguished from strictly property rights." (r92r)
14 A. L. R. 295.
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latter could take the initiative in redressing such wrong. Originally,
therefore, an individual could not prevent political wrongs, since he
had no recognized interest therein. This rule was later modified, but
it was always true that equity would not intervene unless the individual
could show some injury other than the political injury, which was con-
sidered a public wrong. This other injury was usually a violation of
a property interest. The rule, therefore, as it finally developed in this
country was that equity would collaterally restrain an invasion of a
political right only if a property right was also involved.' 5
Today English courts grant injunctions in all cases, irrespective
of the nature of the right involved.16 This is generally ascribed to
the Judicature Act of 1873, § 25 (8) which grants equity the power
to issue injunctions "in all cases in which it shall be just or conven-
ient." However, the Act merely expressed a result towards which the
English courts were tending.
17
In dealing with the American development of the doctrine limit-
ing equitable jurisdiction to property rights, it should be noticed that
despite repeated restatement, courts have nevertheless evaded its actual
application. This judicial reluctance to effectively apply the rule is
unquestionably due to its obvious and arbitrary injustice. Equity will
grant specific performance of contracts, and restrain torts threatening
injury to property; but our system of jurisprudence nevertheless holds
that the only recourse for an invasion of perhaps more sacred and vital
rights of personality is the substitutional remedy of damages, although
both the right and its correlative invasion are incapable of measure-
ment in terms of money."" Hence the recompense of nominal dam-
ages is usually the only award. American courts, therefore, while
constantly repeating the rule, have just as consistently refused to
apply it.
This has been accomplished in a number of ways. The concept
'A full discussion is found in Tretter, supra note 2, at 29o; Brown v.
Cole, 54 Misc. 278, 280, 104 N. Y. Supp. iog, 11o (i9o7). A supplemental
reason is suggested in CLaK, op. cit. supra note 6, 243: "The decision of
purely political questions . . . as the recognition of foreign governments
s .foris not within the province of any court, whether law or equity, but
is for the executive and legislative branches of the government. This has
probably led courts to make the much broader statement that equity has no
jurisdiction over political matters generally."
"8 See Collard v. Marshall [i89i] i Ch. 571 (Injunction against libel to
reputation); Monson v. Tussauds [894] i Q. B. 671 (injunction against ex-
hibition of effigy).
'In Coleman v. Ry. Co., 8 W. R. 734 (i86o), the defendant, pending
litigation, was enjoined from publishing matter prejudicial to the plaintiff's
case. A further proof of the English tendency is found in the fact that the
Common Law Procedure Act of 1854, which gave English law courts equity
powers, was construed as conferring the right to grant injunctions, not only
in cases in which equity could previously have entertained jurisdiction, but
in all cases where no adequate remedy at law existed. See Pound, supra note
2, at 665.
See Chafee (r926) 75 U. oF PA. L. Rsv. 128.
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of property has been expanded in an obvious attempt to protect some
non-property interest; technical property rights have been invented
and protected where no real ones exist.19 The publication of private
letters, without literary or other value, has been enjoined on the theory
of an inherent property right in the combinations of words and ideas,
while the real interest protected has been the right of privacy.2" It
was formerly the unquestioned rule that such intangibles as the right
to labor and the mere right to do or continue business were neither
property nor property rights.2 Yet today the doctrine that the rights
to labor, to seek labor, to hire labor, to carry on business, are property
rights is firmly intrenched in our law.
22
Courts have safeguarded personal rights under the guise of pro-
tecting incidental or technical property rights. In Touchman v.
Welct 23 the right to be free from frequent unnecessary arrest was
protected on the ground that it interfered with plaintiff's business.
Other courts have gone further and totally disregarded the rule.
The peaceful repose of the dead has been safeguarded by injunction.
In Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery 24 the court admits that there is no
property in a dead body, but that certain rights accrue to the next of
kin, and that equity will protect these rights since the remedy at law is
inadequate. The right of privacy was the subject of equitable pro-
tection in Marks v. Jaffe,25 where the court enjoined the publication of
"The tendency is discussed in Ex parte Warfield, 5o S. W. 933 (Tex.
i899), in which the court, after concluding that an open repudiation of the
rule was preferable to an evasion thereof, enjoined the defendant from fur-
ther association with plaintiff's Wife.
'Gee v. Pritchard, supra note 9; Woolsey v. Judd, 4 Duer 379 (N. Y.
1855). See also Schwartz v. Edrington, 133 La. 235, 62 So. 66o (9W3), in
which a newspaper was enjoined from further publication of a petition to the
city council, which had been signed under mistake, and which the signers
now repudiated.
ZtLEwis & SPELLING, LAW OF INJUNCTIONS (1926) § II0.
American Steel & Wire Co. v. Davis, 261 Fed. 8oo (D. Ohio 1919);
International News Service v. Asso. Press, 248 U. S. 215 (1928); Gompers
v. Stove Co., 221 U. S. 418 (igio); New Method Laundry Co. v. McCann,
174 Cal. 26, 161 Pac. g9o (I916).
=42 Fed. 548 (C. C. D. Kan. 189o). In Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N. J.
Eq. 91o, 919, 67 Atl. 97, 101 (19o7) it was said: "If it appeared in this case
that only the complainant's status were thus threatened, . . . we should hold,
and without hesitation, that an individual has rights, other than property
rights, . . . which a court of equity will enforce against invasion. But it is
not necessary to place the decision upon this ground, because there are suffi-
cient facts presented to enable us to put this case upon the technical basis
that the jurisdiction we are exercising is the protection of property rights."
26IO R. I. 227 (1885). Accord: Sherrard v. Henry, 88 IV. Va. 315, 1o6
S. E. 705 (1921).
'6 Misc. 290, 26 N. Y. Supp. go8 (1893). Accord: Munden v. Harris,
133 Mo. App. 652, i34 S. W. iO76 (i9II) (seinble); Wong Wai v. William-
son, 103 Fed. x (igoo) (Board of Health restrained from inoculating Chinese
residents of San Francisco); Eddy v. Board of Health, Io Phila. 94 (1897)
(Board enjoined from removing tenants and closing up houses because of
mere possibility of disease).
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plaintiff's picture. Reputation has been protected by injunction. In
Stark v. Hamilton,"8 defendant was restrained from associating with
the plaintiff's daughter, whom he had debauched, on grounds of pro-
tecting the father's reputation. The right to be free from humiliation
received protection in Kirk v. Wyman 2 7 where a Board of Health was
restrained from sending an elderly woman of delicate breeding and
instincts to a pesthouse.
Despite the broad statements generally made that equity does not
concern itself with political matters,28 in a number of cases jurisdiction
has been assumed over elections, and equitable protection otherwise
afforded to political rights.29  Generally the alleged ratio decidendi is
the prevention of fraudulent or illegal acts,30 especially by public offi-
cials, 31 or the property interest involved in the cost of governmental
administration, 2 including the particular election sought to be en-
joined.3 3 In a few cases, however, such relief has been granted solely
on the ground that equity would protect political rights if the legal
remedy was inadequate.34
Inasmuch as courts of equity have demonstrated an unmistakable
tendency to evade the non-property rule, and since those cases in
which some political or personal right has been denied the protection
of an injunction would have been similarly decided for some other
reason therein appearing, it has been asserted of late years that the
149 Ga. 227, 99 S. E. 861 (1919). Accord: Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115
La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905) (injunction against placing defendant's picture in
rogues' gallery). Stark v. Hamilton -is supposed to rest partly on a statute
which gives equity jurisdiction "where the law would be deficient in prevent-
ing an anticipated wrong." GA. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1926) § 4519. Likewise
Ex parte Warfield, supra note 19, is supposed to rest on statute. TEX. REV.
ST. (1925) § 4642 (3). But less liberal courts would have construed these
statutes as not extending their previous powers. It has been suggested that
this is another method of evading the non-property rule. See Chafee (192i)
34 HARv. L. REV. 388, at 413; (1928) 14 CORN. L. Q. 5O1.
27 83 S. C. 372, 65 S. E. 387 (igog). Accord: Burns v. Stephens, 236
Mich. 443, 21o N. W. 482 (1926) (,former mistress enjoined from using plain-
tiff's name). See Pound, supra note 2, at 672.
28"1. . . nor do matters of a political character come within the jurisdic-
tion of the court of chancery." Fletcher v. Tuttle, 151 Ill. 41, 37 N. E. 683
(1894). PoMEmoy, loc. cit. supra note 7; McCaIUxR, ELECTIONS ( 4 th ed.
1897) 387.
' In addition to the cases cited in note 5, supra. see People v. Tool, 35
Colo. 225, 86 Pac. 224 (9o5) ; Patterson v. People, 23 Colo. App. 469, 13o Pac.
618 (1913); State v. Cunningham. 81 Wis. 440, 51 N. W. 724 (1892).
Pagosa Springs v. People, 23 Colo. App. 479, 130 Pac. 618 (1913) ; Tol-
bert v. Long, supra note 5.
"Brown v. Cole, supra note 15; People v. Tool, supra note 29; Semones
v. Needles, supra note 5. See LEwis & SPELLING, op. cit. supra note 21, § 233.
"Gibson v. Trinity County; Boren v. Smith; both supra note 5.
Macon v. Hughes; Cascaden v. Waterloo; both supra note 5.
Brown v. Cole, supra note 15; Neal v. Young, 75 S. W. 1082 (Ky. 1903);
Patterson v. People, supra note 29. See (1914) 14 Cor. L. REV. 243.
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purported doctrine is solely dictum and has never been actually ap-
plied."5 Such concurrent reasons for denying jurisdiction are, inter
alia, that an adequate legal remedy exists,3 6 that the requested decree
would require too much supervision,37 and that no irreparable injury
is threatened. 8
Although the writer has found no case exclusively decided on the .
ground that equity will not protect personal or political rights, it is
submitted that the doctrine cannot be wholly explained away as
dictum. But it does seem proper to say that the rule may more accu-
rately be classified, not as an independent equity principle, but as a
result of the application of another doctrine. This latter doctrine is
equity's raison d'etre and its cardinal tenet of jurisdiction: that
wherever the law does not provide an adequate, complete, and speedy
remedy, a case has been presented for equitable relief.3 9
Equity, as has been shown, originally refused to entertain juris-
diction over non-property rights because an adequate legal remedy
was available. But subsequent courts did not properly evaluate this
limitation as a derivative of, and therefore secondary to, the funda-
mental doctrine of inadequacy of legal remedy; they accepted the non-
property rule as a new and independent test for determining the
existence of jurisdiction, and therefore applied it even after a changing
social order not only impaired the adequacy of hitherto sufficient legal
remedies but also created new rights for which the law did not provide
complete protection. An examination of recent cases cited as authori-
ties for the rule reveals that its continued application is due solely to
an adherence to past decisions; rarely, if ever, is an attempt made to
justify the doctrine by any principle of logic or justice, and it may
be added that such justification on principle would indeed be difficult,
if not impossible.
Public policy does not sanction, and equity, as seen above, has
been reluctant to effectively enforce, a doctrine which disregards per-
sonal and political rights, the creatures of social progress and civiliza-
tion. But it is submitted that the policy of recognizing the rule while
evading its provisions and effect is not in harmony with the spirit of
equity, which regards the substance and not the form. Nor are the
strained interpretations and distorted definitions reached by circum-
SLong, at 1I7; Tretter, at 288; both supra note 2.
SFletcher v. Tuttle, supra note 28; Dickey v. Reed, 78 Ill. 26Y. (i875);
Holmes v. Oldham, i Hughes 76 (U. S. 1877).
'Giles v. Harris, i89 U. S. 475, 23 Sup. Ct. 639 (I9O3); Winnett v.
Adams, 7i Neb. 817, 99 N. W. 68i (1904).
'Holmes v. Oldham, supra note 36; Re Receiver qf Taxes Election, 4
Pa. Dist. Rep. 7I (1895) ; Jones v. Black, 48 Ala. 540 (1872).
'Schofield, (1913) 8 IL. L. REv. 19, 33: "So far as a question in equity
jurisdiction is concerned, it makes no difference whatever what the subject-
matter of the controversy is; the sole point in question in equity jurisdiction
is the existence or adequacy of another remedy provided by the law." See
also Long, supra note 2, at 132; (914) 14 CoL L. REV. 243, at 244.
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vention of the rule desirable; today rights and their legal incidents are
no longer capable of accurate determination. 0
It is the thesis of this note that equity should repudiate this artifi-
cial limitation upon its extraordinary function as a court of last resort
designed to provide an adequate remedy for every legal wrong not
redressed by law, and assert an untrammeled jurisdiction over all
recognized rights, irrespective of their subject matter. It should be
understood, however, that this jurisdiction is subject to the inherent
restriction that it must not invade the exclusive functions of a court of
law, and further, that a vital question exists as to the propriety of
exercising such jurisdiction, although there may be none as to its
existence.
It follows therefore that equity would assume jurisdiction over
elections as a matter of right, and not because of some concurrent
head of equity jurisdiction. The problem of the propriety of exercis-
ing jurisdiction, however, applies here with especial emphasis, because
of the extreme importance of the elective process in our government;
and equity should therefore be reluctant to intervene unless the right
is clear, the threatened evil great, and the result sought unattainable
by other remedies.
W.B.R.
APPLICATION OF THE SIHERMAN AND CLAYTON ACTS TO HOLD-
ING COMPANIES ORGANIZED BY PARENT RAILROAD CORPORATIONS-
The holding companies recently organized by some of our larger rail-
roads for the apparent purpose of acquiring a controlling stock interest
in some of the smaller roads present a new aspect of an old problem-
the application of the anti-trust statutes. A brief review of the
interpretation given the Sherman Act,' and more recently the Clayton
Act,2 may be made by a comparison of the several cases which stand
as mile-posts in the changing attitude of the Supreme Court. The
passage of the Sherman Act was occasioned by the extreme public
antipathy to large combinations which the various industries were then
effecting. In the light of this antipathy the literal interpretation given
the Sherman Act in the earlier cases decided under it is not surprising.
In the case of U. S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assoc.,3 which
association consisted of a group of railroads organized to maintain
fair and adequate freight rates, the Act was applied in strict accord
'For instance, the court in Munden v. Harris, supra note 25, said: "The
privilege and capacity to exercise a right is a thing of value-is property-
of which one cannot be despoiled." Hence every right, since it is property,
would come within the protection of the property rule.
'15 U. S. C. A. § i et seq. (1894).
'Ibid. § II et seq. (1914).
8 I66 U. S. 290, 17 Sup. Ct. 540 (I896).
NOTES
with its uncompromising terms,4 and a decree issued ordering the dis-
solution of the association. This literal interpretation was a departure
from the common law test of the legality of combinations, which
required that an unreasonable restraint be imposed upon trade to
render the combination illegal.
Fourteen years later in the Standard Oil 5 and the American To-
bacco Co.8 cases we find a complete reversal of interpretation, with
the acceptance of the common law rule of reason as the proper test
for the statute. In the decision of the former case the Court said:
"Thus not specifying but indubitably contemplating and re-
quiring a standard, it follows that it was intended that the
standard of reason which had been applied at the common law
and in this country in dealing with subjects of the character
embraced by the statute, was intended to be the measure used for
the purpose of determining whether in a given case a particular
act had or had not brought about the wrong against which the
statute provides." 
7
This test was applied and the rule of reason defined in the concurrently
decided American Tobacco Co. case.
8
Objections might be raised to these statements, since, in view of
the dissolution decree in each instance, they are little more than dicta.
However, in the American Can case,0 decided under the Clayton Act,
the same rule was applied with even greater latitude. The corporation
was admittedly organized to effect a monopoly in the industry, it was
'Ibid. at 328, 17 Sup. Ct. at 554: "When . . . the body of an act pro-
nounces as illegal every contract or combination in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several states, etc.1 the plain and ordinary meaning of such
language is not limited to that kind of contract alone which is in unreason-
able restraint of trade, but all, contracts are included in such language, and
no exception or limitation can be added without placing in the act that which
has been omitted by Congress." See also U. S. v. Joint Traffic Assoc., 171
U. S. 505, 19 Sup. Ct. 25 (1898); Addyston Pipe etc. Co. v. U. S., 175 U. S.
211, 20 Sup. Ct. 96 (i899).
'U. S, v. Standard Oil Co., 221 U. S. i, 3 Sup. Ct. 502 (91o).
'U. S. v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. io6, 31 Sup. Ct. 632 (1910).
See also U. S. v. Whiting, 212 Fed. 466 (C. C. A., 6th 1915).
Supra note 5 at 60, 31 Sup. Ct. at 516.
'Su pra note 6 at 179, 3, Sup. Ct. at 648: "Applying the rule of reason
to the construction of the statute, it was held in the Standard Oil Case that
as the words 'restraint of trade' at common law and in the law of this country
at the time of the adoption of the Anti-trust Act only embraced acts or con-
tracts or agreements or combinations which operated to the prejudice of the
public interests by unduly restricting competition or unduly obstructing the
course of trade or which, either because of their inherent nature or effect or
because of the evident purpose of the acts, etc., injuriously restrained trade,
that the words as used in the statute were designed to have and did have but
a like significance."
923o Fed. 859 (D. C. D. Md. 1916).
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in form and purpose a holding company acting as trustee for the
shares of various competing concerns and had, as stated by the Court,
in the past employed practices banned by the Sherman Act. Testi-
mony showed that in spite of its effort toward monopoly, competition
had survived. In merely retaining the bill for purposes of future
action should the illegal practices be resumed, the Court thus justified
its decision:
"The record shows that there are many ways in which a
large and strong can maker can serve the trade, and a small one
cannot. Perhaps it did not require much testimony to show that
he who is strong and rich has more ability to serve than he who
is poor and weak, provided always that there is an equal wish to
do so." 10
The Court distinguishes the case, in spite of the former activities of
the defendant corporation, on the ground that it had ceased its illegal
practices a considerable time prior to the suit, while in cases where
dissolution had been ordered, the defendant had persisted therein prac-
tically up to the institution of the proceedings."-
This case was followed by that of the U. S. Steel Co.1 2 in which
the comparatively generous rule of reason was broadened into a doc-
trine of public policy. The history of the corporation had been no
more savory than that of the American Can Co., yet a similar approval
was accorded it. From these later cases it is evident that the rule
today applicable to the anti-trust acts is one based entirely upon public
benefit, often determined by the hind-sight test of judging by result
rather than origin. If the ultimate result of a combination inures in
fact to the benefit of the public, its illegal origin is not sufficient to
bring it within the operation of the anti-trust acts.
To this liberal interpretation given the Sherman and Clayton
Acts when applied to most branches of commerce, the literal interpre-
tation applied when railroads are involved is in striking contrast. It
would seem more natural, with the great power of control afforded the
Interstate Commerce Commission over the rates and services of the
carriers, that the emphasis on competition would diminish and public
protection be sought in the supervision of the Commission. However,
the decisions of the Court tend to the opposite. The strict application
of the Sherman Act employed in U. S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Assoc.'s has been cited as a controlling precedent in the majority of
" Ibid at 903.
a'Ibid at 9o2: "In most of the cases in which dissolution has been de-
creed, the defendant had, not long before proceedings against them were in-
stituted, done things which evidenced their continued intent to dominate and
restrain trade by the use of methods which interfered more or less seriously
with the reasonable freedom of their customers or their competitors."
"U. S. v. U. S. Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417, 40 Sup. Ct. 293 (1919).
3 Supra note 3.
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cases involving a combination of carriers. An instance of this is
found in the case of Northern Securities Co. v. U. S.: I"
"That every combination or conspiracy which would extin-
guish competition between otherwise competing railroads engaged
in interstate trade or commerce, and which would in that way
restrain such trade or commerce, is made illegal by the act."
Though an appreciation of the more liberal trend in interpretation
is evidenced in U. S. v. Union Pacific R. R.,5 where the Court quotes
with approval the rule expressed in the American Tobacco Co. deci-
sion,16 it then proceeds to *stress a part of that decision to the effect
that ". . . the statute did not forbid or restrain the power to make
normal and usual contracts to further trade by resorting to all normal
methods, whether by agreement or otherwise, to accomplish such
purpose", and then arbitrarily continues:
"We take it therefore that it may be regarded as settled,
applying the statute as construed in the decisions of this court,
that a combination which places railroads engaged in interstate
commerce in such relation as to create a single doninating con-
trol in one corporation, whereby natural and existing competition
in interstate commerce is unduly restricted or suppressed, is
within the condemnation of the act." 
17
It is submitted that the extreme example assumed by the Court of
complete unification should not be applied without qualification to
lesser combinations to the effect that such could not be the natural
growth of the industry, yet the decision in U. S. v. Southern Pacific
Co.,:' delivered nine years later, is in complete accord.
This attitude towards combinations of carriers is difficult to un-
derstand in the light of the benefit afforded by a more liberal treatment
of other industries. It is hardly unreasonable to hope that a policy of
laissez faire, restricted to established limits, might prove equally for-
tuitous if similarly applied to railroads. One means of testing such
a policy may be found in a kindly attitude towards the holding com-
panies under discussion.
The purpose of the railroads in organizing these holding com-
panies is unquestionably to vest in hands, friendly to themselves, a
controlling interest in the stocks of the smaller lines, the absorption
1 193 U. S. I97, 331, 24 Sup. Ct. 436, 454 (1903).
2226 U. S. 6i, 33 Sup. Ct. 53 (912).
" Supra note 8.
'TSupra note I5 at 85, 33 Sup. Ct. at 57.
1259 U. S. 214, 42 Sup. Ct. 496 (i92i).
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of which is essential to the economic development of the major car-
riers. By the employment of such means the larger companies are
enabled to purchase at opportune times the stocks desired, without
focusing public attention upon their desirability for purposes of specu-
lation. The suggestion of this point is well made by Commissioner
Farrell in his dissent to the recent order of the Commission in the
Baltinore & Ohio case."
Any economies that can be effected by the carriers in the merging
of the smaller roads that must eventually take place will ultimately inure
to the benefit of the public. The Court has, in regard to other indus-
tries, ruled that such a result justifies the means employed. Hence a
generous attitude by the government to the companies under discus-
sion might well commend itself.
M. G. M., Jr.
THE EFFECT OF DIVORCE ON ESTATES BY THE ENTIRETIES-
A conveyance of real or personal property to a husband and wife con-
stitutes them tenants by the entireties, peculiar features of which estate
are the attendant right of the surviving spouse to hold the estate in
fee simple and the concurrent limitation preventing either from in any
way alienating the estate or charging it with individual claims.1 An
obviously perplexing problem arises upon contemplation of the effect
of termination of the marital state other than by death, as in the case
of divorce.
The solution of the problem depends on the true nature of the
estate. In legal conception it is a unit owned in entirety by one legal
entity.2 If the estate is an unconditional one nothing that occurs after
it vests, death excepted, can destroy it; if the estate vests uncondition-
ally in the persons who are husband and wife at the time of conveyance
"I. C. C. v. B. & 0. R. 1. Co., U. S. Daily, Jan. 2oth, 193o at page io:
"If such a purchase cannot be made until after the intent to purchase has
been advertised by an application made to us, it seems to me that it can not
be made at all as a practical matter, because such advertisement would result
in such an increase in the price demanded for the stock to be purchased that
the purchase would not be in the public interest."
'For a thorough discussion of the nature, characteristics and inception
of the estate see the following and cases therein cited: Note in 3o L. R. A. 304
(1895) 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. ig20) § 194; 2 BT. Comm. 182
(". . if an estate in fee be given to a man and his wife, they are neither
properly joint tenants, nor tenants in common: for husband and wife being
considered as one person in law, they cannot take the estate by moities, but
both are seised of the entirety, per tout et non per my.") ; cases in 30 CoRus
JUas 564
'U. S. v. Provident Trust Co., 35 F. (2d) 339 '(C. C. A. 3rd, 1929)
citing Biehl v. 'Martin, 236 Pa. 519, 522, 84 Atl. 953, 954 (1912); Sharpe v.
Baker, 51 Ind. App. 547, 96 N. E. 627 (1912).
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their subsequent divorce is of no effect. It was a well recognized
fiction at common law that married persons constituted but one legal
person,' and that upon divorce they returned to their former status as
two legal entities.4  Since the estate can be wholly owned by but one
legal entity, to regard the divorcees as both owning it would be an
anomaly. Therefore, the estate would seem to be conditional. It
may be divested if the grantees no longer remain married. Hence,
there should be no tenancy by the entireties after divorce.
Death and inalienability further illustrate the conditional nature
of the estate and the necessity that the parties continue to be married.
In the event of death of one spouse the estate is terminated, 5 no one
succeeds to that spouse's "interest" for such "successor" would not
bear the same relation to the survivor-they could not together make
only one legal person. Therefore, the survivor takes an estate in him-
self and that same property is held in that manner rather than as a
tenancy by the entireties. One spouse cannot alienate his or her
present interest in the estate to a third .party;6 such third party could
not be a tenant by the entireties for the same reason, the necessary
legal relation would be impossible. All that a spouse can assign is his
or her interest in surviving the other spouse.7
The overwhelming weight of authority is that divorce a viniculo
terminates an estate by the entireties 8 and the parties hold as joint
'Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611, 614, 31 Sup. Ct. III, (191o)
("At the common law the husband and wife were regarded as one,-the legal
existence of the wife during coverture being merged'in that of the husband.");
Bramberry's Estate, 156 Pa. 628, 27 Atl. 405 (1893) ; 4 KENT Comm. 362.
'Anstey v. Manners, Gow io (Eng. 1818) (divorce ab initio); Gilley v.
Gilley, 79 Me. 292, 9 Atl. 623 (1887) (". . . these ijarties become as good
as strangers."); 2 BIsHoP, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION (2d ed. I89i)
§ 1596.
1 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note i, 656.
'In re Berry, 247 Fed. 700, 7o6 (E. D. Mich. 1917); Hurd v. Hughes,
12 Del. Ch. 188, 19o, iog Atl. 418, 419 C1920) (". . . neither can sell any inter-
est except with the other's consent, and by their joint act.") but see infra note
7; Meyer's Estate, No. 1, 232 Pa. 89, 94, 8r Atl. 145, '47 C9,1). Contra:
Schulz v. Ziegler, 8o N. J. Eq. i99, 83 Atl. 968 (1912) (where it was held a
purchaser from the husband becomes a tenant in common with the wife during
the joint lives of husband and wife).
7This, of course, applies to the wife only where a married woman could
transfer an interest in pfoperty. Taub v. Shampanier, 95 N. J. L. 349, 112
Atl. 322 (192o); Hiles v. Fisher, 144 N. Y. 3o6, 39 N. E. 337 (895). But see
O'Malley, v. O'Malley, 272 Pa. 528, 533, i16 At. 500, 502 (1922).
'(918) 16 Mici. L. Rxv. 266; BisHoP, op. cit. supra note 4, § 165o;
TIFFANY, loc. cit. supra note 5; see cases cited in 19 CoRPus JUtis i8?. This
question did not arise at common law because divorce by the spiritual courts
made the marriage void ab initio and divorcees returned to the same status
as if never married. Ames v. Norman, 4 Sneed, 683, 696 (Tenn. 1857); I
Br- Comr. 435, 44o; Thornley v. Thornley, 2 Ch. D. 229 (893) (English
Married Women's Acts effected an abolition of tenancy by the entireties, there-
fore the question does not arise in England).
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tenants 0 or tenants in common. 10 Though Pennsylvania has by stat-
ute 11 abandoned its former position 12 and approached the ranks of the
majority of the jurisdictions in holding divorce makes this estate ter-
minable, the Pennsylvania case of Alles v. Lyon"' is frequently cited
as the best expression of the minority view." That case advanced the
proposition that the quality of the estate is determined at its inception
and since a grant to a man and woman before they were married was
held by tenancy in common or joint tenancy and continued to be so
held if they later married, e converso where property is held by the
entireties subsequent dissolution of the marriage should not convert
the estate into some other form of tenancy. The fallacy of this rea-
soning lies in the major premise-that the quality of the estate is
determined at its inception. 5  This is precisely the problem. Admit-
'The tendency of courts and legislatures is to favor tenancy in common
over joint tenancy. Unless it is expressly shown that the grantor wished to
create a joint tenancy a conveyance to two persons will 'be construed as crea-
tion of a tenancy in common, hence the tendency is to set up a tenancy in
common after divorce where property was held by the entireties. For a com-
mendable r~sum6 of the status of this estate see, TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note
7, 630 et seq.; 2 SCHOULER, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND DOMESTIC
RELATIONS (6th ed. 1921) § 1944. It has been held that property owned by
entireties, will, after divorce, be held as joint tenancy only if it was originally
conveyed as a joint tenancy, which relation was changed by law into a ten-
ancy by the entireties. Lash v. Lash, 58 Ind. 526 (1877).
"State v. Ellison, 290 Mo. 28, 233 S. W. io65 (1921); Sbarbaro v.
Sbarbaro, 88 N. J. Eq. IOI, io2 Atl. 256 (1917); Schafer v. Schafer, 122
Ore. 620, 260 Pac. 206 (927) commented on (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 469;
TIFFANY, 10c. cit. supra note 5; SCHOULER, 10C. cit. supra note 9.
I Act of May io, 1927, P. L. 884, PA. STAT. (West, 1928) § IOI72b.
... whenever any husband and wife hereafter acquiring property as ten-
ants by entireties, shall be divorced, either of such tenants by entireties may
bring suit . . . against the other to have the property sold and the proceeds
divided between them." Italics the writer's. By this statute termination of
the estate is optional with either party, while under the majority view the
estate automatically terminates.
'The latest expression of the Pennsylvania holding that divorce does not
terminate the estate is O'Malley v. O'Malley, supra note 7.
"216 Pa. 6c4, 66 AtI. 81 (19o7).
"Davies v. Johnson, 124 Ark. 390, 392, 187 S. W. 323, 324 (1916) ; Stew-
art v. Bleau's Estate, 147 Atl. 692 (Vt. 1929). Michigan and Arkansas, with
Pennsylvania, for many years, constituted the "minority." In re Lewis, 85
Mich. 340, 48 N. W. 58o (1891) ("We see no reason for holding that a hus-
band or wife can by a violation of the marital obligations, obtain an interest
in land which she or he does not possess while fulfilling such obligations ...
common law should not . . . permit one to profit by his own . . . wrong.").
However, in igog a Michigan statute provided that a tenancy by the entireties
was changed into a tenancy in common by a divorce decree unless otherwise
provided. 3 MicH. CoMP. LAWS (Cahill, 1915) 4o66.
"A possible basis for this reasoning may have been that the property
rights of the tenants were determined at inception, i. e.: the younger tenant
had a greater chance of survivorship according to an annuity table; if then,
the estate is divided equally at divorce, such tenant would thereby be deprived
of a property right, while the other would gain. Cogent as this may be it
still involves an erroneous assumption, viz.: that death only, and not divorce,
will terminate the estate.
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tedly, if the estate is unconditional and fixed there is no subsequent
happening that can divest it. By drawing the analogy to a tenancy in
common followed by marriage the court compared two entirely differ-
ent estates.' 6
In Vermont, the question has arisen for the first time in the recent
case of Stewart v. Bleau's Estate.1 7  After recognizing the division of
authority the Supreme Court of that State followed the reasoning of
the majority holdings as "irresistible", incidentally repudiating a
dictum in a former case I' in that jurisdiction.
. . . as the estate is founded upon the unity of husband and
wife and never could exist in the first place but for such unity,
anything that terminates the legal fiction of this unity ought to
terminate the estate whose creation depends upon such unity."
Other decisions by courts following the majority rule are based on the
same line of reasoning.'
9
A few jurisdictions retained, for some time, the old fiction that
husband and wife are but one person, therefore they could hold prop-
erty oiny by the entireties since it is but one estate, held by but one
person and that any expression of intent to the contrary was nuga-
tory.20  That a modem court would adhere to this archaic principle is
improbable inasmuch as even the common law, i. e., before the passage
of the Married Women's Acts, permitted married persons to hold
property as joint tenants or tenants in common.2 1 By the adoption of
the Married Women's Acts 22 and a more liberal attitude toward the
"A tenancy by the entireties is said to be in theory a joint tenancy modi-
fied by the common law doctrine that husband and wife are one legal entity.
This estate is held per tout et nonr per my but joint tenants are seised per my
et per tout, (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 469. joint tenants .own an undi-
vided one-half interest. Shapiro, Estates by Entirety (1913) 61 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 48o. Frans v. Young, 24 Iowa 375 (i868). (There is no restriction on
the right to assign or encumber one's interest in a joint tenancy); Messing
v. Messing, 64 N. Y. App. Div. 125, 71 N. Y. Supp. 717 (;goi) ; in tenancy
in common the seisin is per my et non per tout and there is no right of sur-
vivorship.
147 Atl. 692 (Vt. 1929).
Corinth v. Emery, 63 Vt. 505, 22 Atl. 68 (189I).
"Ames v. Norman, supra note 8, frequently cited as the best expression
of the majority view ("The law, in destroying the unity of persons between
them, has, by necessary consequence, destroyed the unity of seisin in respect
to their joint estate; for independent of the matrimonial union this tenancy
cannot exist"). See cases cited in TIFFANY, loc. cit. supra note 5.
'Lux v. Hoff, 47 Ill. 425 (1868) ; Stuckey v. Keefe, 26 Pa. 307 (1856)
(tracing the common law basis). For history of this development and change
to modem rule see Wilson v. Frost, I86 Mo. 311, 85 S. W. 375 (19o5).
Note to Nichols v. Nichols, 2 Plow. 477, 483 (Eng. 1574) ; 2 PRESTON,
ESTATES (1828) 132; 4 KENT COMM. 363.
'For a brief summary of the effect of the Married Women's Acts in
-each state, see WILSON, LEGAL AND POLITICAL STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE
UNITED STATES (1912).
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rights of married women, the courts of this country have allowed the
ancient disability of married women to hold interests in property to
sink into oblivion.2 s Hence any court whose reasoning is an adoption
of that concept would be obviously out of trend with the universally
recognized fact of a changing status for the feme covert class.
Most of the courts holding divorce ends the estate are in jurisdic-
tions looking on the tenancy by entireties as the result of a legally
presumed intention on the part of the grantor to make the husband
and wife, grantees, tenants by the entireties.24 Thus, if there is a
strong indication of a different intention it will be recognized and
adhered to. 5 Yet in continuing to refer to "the legal fiction of unity"
as the basis for the "presumed intention" these courts leave open the
same issue for controversy as existed to a greater degree in the reason-
ing of courts strictly following the common law. Because of the
historic nature of the estate and the efficacy of maintaining it in the
law 26 as a means of keeping property free from creditors and inher-
SMcCormick v. U. S., (decided in the U. S. Customs Court, Jan. 21,
1930) IV U. S. Daily 3209 (containing a thorough tracing of the status of
married women from the common law to the present day. "The common law
theory of marriage has largely ceased to obtain. The wife is now a distinct
legal entity. She now stands in most, if not all, of the States on terms of
equality with her husband in respect to property, torts, contracts and civil
rights.").
"'Harrison v. Ray, io8 N. C. 215, 12 S. E. 993 (1891); TIFFANY, op. cit.
supra note I, 647. Pennsylvania courts are in confusion on this point, Stuckey
v. Keefe, supra note 20 (intention immaterial, husband and wife can hold only
as tenants by the entireties) ; Merritt v. Whitlock, 2oo Pa. 5o, 55, 49 Atl. 786,
787 (igoi) (". . . it may be considered as still an open question whether
they may not, now, since the act referred to, take as well as hold in common,
if that be the actual intent, notwithstanding the legal presumption to the
contrary"). It would seem that to make possible a holding that divorce did
not terminate the tenancy it would be necessary to consider the estate as based
on a "presumed intent," rather than on the fictional unity. But see Shapiro,
op. cit. supra note 16, 478, which article further suggests that Married Women's
Acts have removed the reason for this estate, opposed to Bramberry's Estate,
i56 Pa-. 628, 27 Atl. 405 (1893) (These acts do not change the nature Df
married woman's estate.).
- TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note i, 646, and cases cited therein; (1923) 21
Micr. L. REv. 817.
'The best evidence of the desirability of maintaining this form of tenancy
is in its growing popularity as a form of tenure for personalty. Strictly
speaking, it would seem that a tenancy by the entiretes in personal property
could not exist at common law, for the reason that under its rules all personal
property of the wife was regarded as reduced to the possession of the husband.
However, under modern practice this reason no longer exists. Cases and text-
writers are in conflict as to whether courts permitting tenancy by the en-
tireties in personalty constitute the majority. FREEMAN, COTENANCY AND
PARTITION (2d ed. 1886) § 68 (". . . the reports abound in cases recogniz-
ing tenancy by entireties in . . . personal estates") ; I BISHOP, LAW OF MAR-
RIED WOMEN (1873) §211 ("Nothing of this sort . . . [tenancy by the en-
tirety] . . . is known in respect of personal property"). Secondary authori-
ties seem in accord that the majority of the jurisdictions permit this form of
tenure in personalty. 8 A. L. R. 1017; 30 CORPUS JuRIs 574; (1927) 13 IowA
L. REv. io8. Contra: Note (1924) 38 HARv. L. Rv. 244, footnote 13 ("But
the orthodox view is against any estates by entirety in personalty").
NOTES
itance taxes 27 it is submitted that the desirable result could best be
reached by continuing the legal presumption that the-grantor intended
to create a tenancy by the entireties, as it existed at the common law,
upon conveyance to a husband and wife. The basis for this intent
may well be custom which in turn finds supjort in the history of the
estate. In this manner all of the incidents of the tenancy survive
without a forced recognition of a "legal fiction" which is no longer
recognized in any other field of the civil law.
There is a modern, practical reason for following the ancient rule
that divorced persons should not hold as tenants by the entireties. If
such were possible a third party relying on the existence of property
in the divorcee with whom he is dealing is not as apt to be put on
notice as to the true nature and inalienability of the estate as if he
were dealing with an individual who was still married.28  The exist-
ence of the potentialities for fraud are particularly alarming when a
court permits husband and wife to hold a business as tenants by the
entireties.2 9
For this practical reason, in addition to the even more compelling
logical one previously given, the estate* should not continue when the
parties are no longer married. This end may satisfactorily be achieved
by adopting the rule of construction that a grant to two persons, hus-
band and wife in fact, shows an intent to create a tenancy by the
entireties as that estate existed at common law.
J.P.B.
1 U. S. v. Provident Trust Co., supra note 2; for comment on this case
(i93o) 78 U. oF PA. L. REv. 572.
'The necessity for recording title to realty and the fact that some writ-
ing conveying title often accompanies personalty somewhat limits this possi-
bility.
,Flaherty v. Columbus, 41 App. Div. D. C. 525 (914); George v. Dut-
ton's Estate, 94 Vt. 76, xo8 At. 515 (0920).
